“Salvation for Heretics?”
by Andrew Harrison
In his 2009 work Heresy, Alister McGrath attempts to define the essential nature of heresy. Along the way, however, he makes multiple statements that seem to indicate that heretical beliefs, while eventually destructive to their host belief system, usually originate from well-intentioned Christians who just happen to err, despite their best efforts to pursue right doctrine. This essay explains the non-traditional nature of McGrath’s view, which seems to imply the possibility of ‘saved heretics’, and considers a possible motive for such a view of heresy.
The Necessity of Doctrine to Salvation
The church has historically held that acceptance of certain central doctrines of the gospel, such as the divinity of Jesus or the nature of the Trinity, constitutes a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for placing saving faith in Christ. McGrath’s pronouncements about the nature of heresy, however, potentially call this view into question. Because McGrath describes his thesis as historical rather than theological, he never explicitly rejects this traditional view, arguing that heretical beliefs can be compatible with personal salvation, but his claims slip into the normative realm, and the reader may infer his theological position by discerning a number of hints (albeit strong ones) he drops along the way.
First, consider McGrath’s working definition of heresy: “Heresy is best seen as a form of Christian belief that, more by accident than design, ultimately ends up subverting, destabilizing, or even destroying the core of Christian faith.”[1] This definition includes two themes that continue throughout the work:
(1) that the impact of heresy can be observed primarily at the collective or system-wide level rather than at the individual level; and
(2) that identifying a particular belief as heretical in nature is something observable only over time, since that belief’s destructive nature becomes clear by way of its effects, again manifested at the collective level of the entire belief system.
One will hardly disagree with McGrath about the long-term, systemic destructive consequences of heresy. However, a characteristic that is notably absent from his definition is the immediate and individual-level impact that adherence to some heretical belief has on one’s ability to receive salvation. This has been a mainstay of the Church’s historical understanding of heresy, that it is incompatible with, or disqualifies an individual from receiving salvation. This was the view and practice of the early church fathers, who saw themselves as simply continuing the teaching of the apostles (cf. 1 Tim. 6:3-10; 1 Jn. 4:1-3). McGrath, by contrast, uses a variety of exonerating language as he consistently paints a picture of the ‘innocent heretic’, whose “honorable intentions” just happen to result in a “failed attempt at orthodoxy.”[2]
Lastly, consider what may simultaneously be both his strongest and weakest statements regarding the relationship between heresy and unbelief: “The essential feature of a heresy is that it is not unbelief (rejection of the core beliefs of a worldview such as Christianity) in the strict sense of the term, but a form of that faith that . . . indirectly leads to such unbelief. Unbelief is the outcome, but not the form, of heresy.”[3] From these statements, we are left with the likelihood that McGrath’s theory permits salvation for heretics. Ultimately, though, this is left as an open question.
The Innocent Heretic
To this point we have attributed to McGrath potentially two related, but distinct claims. First, that such a marriage of good intentions with heretical beliefs is even possible. And second, that if such a scenario were possible, those who accept some heresy can still exercise saving faith. If these are fair interpretations of McGrath’s views, what is leading him to conclusions that depart from the Church’s historical views on heresy?
One interesting approach to answering this question is to observe how McGrath’s view constitutes one of three possible responses to the familiar problem of the ‘innocent’ heretic. Theologians have forever grappled with the hypothetical scenario of the individual who makes every effort to find God and follow God, but, due to doctrinal error, ends up as lost as the hell-raising pagan next door. We envision this well-intentioned God-seeker as failing to ‘carry the one’ in his doctrinal calculations, so to speak, and ending up a heretic. Of course, such scenarios, if possible, carry with them a certain level of moral discomfort. To put it summarily, if God truly wants all men to be saved, then why would he fail to ensure that men who seek him find him?
McGrath’s approach, then, resolves this moral tension by minimizing or rejecting the necessity of right doctrine for receiving salvation. On McGrath’s view, adherence to core Christian doctrines is not absolutely necessary for salvation, at least for certain people in certain contexts.[4] But can such a view be reconciled with Scripture? The Church has historically denied such a claim. But McGrath’s move, which again supposedly eases the doctrinal requirements for salvation, is only one of two approaches at resolving the problem of the innocent heretic.
A second response is to reject that there is such a thing as an innocent heretic. Here, there just is no possible world where an individual truly pursues God’s truth, but instead commits heresy. This is a view that was advocated by the 18th century preacher Joseph Lyman, who insisted, “. . . there is a degree of criminality in all who imbibe false sentiments in religion, since all have the means of better information and would not be missed were not some criminal inattention or prejudice at the foundation of their unscriptural faith.”[5] This is presumably the driving idea behind some Arminians’ theology, the fundamental moral principle that moral blame (and praise) attaches properly only to those agents who have it within their power to ‘do otherwise’ in some given action. The man with no medical history who suffers a seizure while driving on the interstate, crosses traffic, and kills a family of four, is guilty neither legally nor morally, precisely because of the recognition that it was not within his power to have done otherwise.
In Arminian theology, this power or ability to accept or reject God is not a Pelagian kind of free will, where fallen man pulls himself up by his own bootstraps, and attains to God’s forgiveness. Instead, it is a Spirit-enabled condition of a will set free to either accept or reject Christ’s offering of salvation. Whatever doctrines, then, a person is responsible for accepting to have a restored relationship with God, the Spirit, through perhaps both supernatural and natural means, makes these truths clear, and acceptance of these truths is just entailed in his acceptance of Christ. On this view, it is never appropriate to speak of a heretic as simply accidentally missing the doctrinal bullseye. Heretics ultimately choose to be heretics; heresy entails a personal rejection of Christ.
A final possible response to the problem of the innocent heretic is simply to swallow the pill of both his innocence and his guilt. For Calvinists, this is just another day at the office, theologically speaking. Such ‘seekers’ are on a doomed path from the start, aiming in vain to discover a truth that is undiscoverable while dead in sin, apart from the Spirit’s testimony and guidance. Continuing this Calvinist train of thought, whatever orthodox beliefs that accompany a person’s salvation are guaranteed from the start, the Spirit having ensured that no misstep ever occurs. There really is no successful effort or failed effort on the Calvinist scheme; there is only the presence or absence of the Holy Spirit’s irresistible influence. It would require a separate discussion as to whether this option is compatible with Arminian theology as well.
Conclusion
As for McGrath’s stance, one must simply wait for his explicit response to the question. But many will be troubled by the impunity he seems to confer on the individual heretic. At the same time, though, some may see McGrath’s position as a welcome resolution to what they see as the peculiar doctrine of a person’s intellectual beliefs serving part of what determines his eternal moral destiny. Perhaps there exist true God-followers in a greater variety of contexts than the Church typically permits. But does Scripture allow for such? Whatever one’s own inclinations regarding the hard question of pure intentions accompanying heresy, we must fix Scripture as our ultimate guide, leaving to divine mystery whatever questions remain.
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About the Author: Andrew lives in Madison, Alabama with his wife Laura and their two girls Charlie and Lucy, where they attend Madison Free Will Baptist Church. He is a graduate of Welch College and also holds a master’s degree in philosophy from the University of Tennessee. His research interests include epistemology, free will, abstract objects, and philosophy of language, especially as they intersect with Christian theology and apologetics.
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[1] Alister McGrath, Heresy: A History of Defending the Truth (New York: HarperOne, 2009), 11-12.
[2] Ibid., 13.
[3] Ibid., 33; italics in original.
[4] One possibility not discussed here is that McGrath conceives of some kind of continuum of heretical beliefs, where some heresies are indeed salvation-preventing and others not. Again, this would just be a fundamental alteration of the traditional notion of heresy, which is usually reserved only for those doctrinal errors that are salvation-preventing.
[5] Joseph Lyman, “A Belief of the Peculiar Doctrines of Christianity Essential to Our Acceptance with God,” in Sermons, on various important doctrines and duties of the Christian religion; selected from the manuscripts of several ministers, members of the Northern Association, in the County of Hampshire (Northampton, MA: Printed by William Butler, 1799), 154.
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